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INTRODUCTION  




οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφοµεν, ἀλλὰ βίους 
We do not however write histories, but Lives (Plutarch) 
  
These   articles   are   intended   as   samples   demonstrating   the   vivacity   of  
research   in   the   field   of   biography   today.   Their   authors   have   all   published  
books  of   international   repute   relative   to   the   theory  of   biography.  They  are  
either   historians   or   literary   scholars,   as   are  many   of   the   academic   writers  
who  have  defined  biography  as  their  object  of  research  in  recent  years.  The  
biographical   turn,   as   we   find   convenient   to   call   the   renewed   interest   in  
biography   and   biographic   approaches   that   has   been   taking   place   over   the  
last  decades,  converging  from  several  disciplines  of  the  humanities,  appears  
like   a   paradigmatic   debate   of   sorts,   that   both   calls   for   a   new  definition   of  
biography   in   the   larger   sense   of   the   term,   and   generates   a   theoretical  
demand.    
On   the  one  hand,  biography   is   in  part   a   literary  genre,   long  disparaged  as  
minor  —  but  after  Deleuze  this  should  rather  be  considered  as  a  promising  
asset.   What   some   German   scholars   call   its   “Theorieresistenz”   [FETZ   &  
SCHWEIGER  :   5]   is   much   less   a   resistance   to   theorisation   that   would   be  
inherent  to  biography,  than  a  resistance  of  “theory”  to  biography,  due  to  the  
particular  bend  of  a  period   in   the  history  of   the  humanities,  and  especially  
literary   science,   characterised   by   the   hegemony   of   literary   theory   over  
literary  history  and  criticism.  On  the  other  hand,  biography  imposes  itself  de  
facto   as   a   practice,   that   for   all   intents   and   purposes   seems   central   to   some  
post-­‐‑“theory”  advancements  in  the  humanities.    
In   literary  science,   this  has  been  observed  in  genetic  criticism,  studying  the  
manuscript   traces   of   the   growth   and   birth   of   a   text   in   the   crucible   of   its  
author’s  mind,   in  New  Historicism,   recontextualising   literary   productions;  
or  in  reception  theories,  centring  on  the  reading  subject,  as  well  as  in  various  
schools,  from  feminist  to  post-­‐‑colonial  studies  and  their  many  variants,  that  
focus   on   the   individual   as   a  member,   either   unique   or   typical,   of   a   given  
community.   The   relevance   of   biographical   approaches   in   literary   science  
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today  is  demonstrated,  in  particular,  by  the  authors  whose  texts  Robert  Dion  
and  Frédéric  Regard,  have  co-­‐‑edited   in   their  recent  collection,  Les  Nouvelles  
écritures  biographiques  (2013).    
History  has  renewed  its  dialogue  with  biography  when  it  departed  from  the  
long  duration,  from  living  history  to  micro-­‐‑history  —  the  microstoria  school  
of  Carlo  Ginzburg   and  Giovanni   Levi.  Grounding   her   reflection   on   a   new  
reading   of   the  works   of   pre-­‐‑modernist   thinkers   like  Herder,  Droysen,   and  
Dilthey,   Sabina   Loriga   offers   a   very   convincing   advocacy   of   “l’histoire  
biographique”  [14]  in  Le  Petit  x.  De  la  biographie  à  l’histoire  (2010).  In  sociology,  
the   followers   of   what   Mauss   used   to   call   a   “phenomenology   of   the  
individual,”  via   the  participative  methods  of   the  Chicago  School  and  Mass  
Observation,  have  fostered  the  use  of  the  “récits  de  vie”  as  a  methodology  in  
several  domains,  developing  into  life-­‐‑writing  studies,  which  have  become  a  
quasi-­‐‑discipline   in   their   own   right,   especially   in   the  United   States   and   the  
United  Kingdom.  
Life-­‐‑writing,   however,   while   using   biographical   and   autobiographical  
writings   as   both   objects   and  methods   of   research,   has   not   produced  much  
far-­‐‑reaching   meta-­‐‑discourse   so   far,   and   seems   far   less   interested   in  
elaborating   a   theory   of   (auto-­‐‑)biographic   writing   than   in   using   it   as   a  
medium  of  academic  production.  That  is  one  of  the  main  theses  defended  by  
Hans   Renders   and   Binne   de   Haan   in   Theoretical   Discussions   of   Biography  :  
Approaches   from   History,   Microhistory,   and   Life   Writing   (Brill   Academic  
Publishing,   2014),  where  Renders   further   argues   that   biography,  which   he  
sees  as  distinct  from  life-­‐‑writing,  is  essentially  a  form  of  historiography,  and  
therefore   a   branch   of   history,   thus   implicitly   engaging   a   debate   with   Ira  
Bruce  Nadel,  who  had  maintained  earlier,  in  Biography  :  Fiction,  Fact  &  Form  
(St   Martin’s   Press,   1984),   that   for   biographical   studies   “the   new   model   is  
Max  Weber   not   Freud”   [188],   thus   implying   that   the   theory   of   biography  
should  take  its  clues  from  sociology,  rather  than  from  psychology.  
While   resisting   the   temptation   to   take   sides   in   this   current   debate   for   the  
time   being,   it   should   be   noted   that   the   very   liveliness   of   the   debate   itself,  
which   has   been   lasting   for   at   least   a   quarter   of   a   century,   testifies   to   the  
existence  of  a   theory  need,  a  demand  for   theory,  singling  out  biography   in  
the  larger  sense  —  not  just  the  literary  genre  —  as  an  interdisciplinary  field  
of   research   within   the   humanities,   whose   theorisation   appears   to   be  
forthcoming,   although   it   remains   for   the  moment   in   a   protracted   incipient  
stage.   In   this   respect,  mentalities  have  evolved   to  a  point  where  biography  
research  writers  no  longer  feel  obliged  to  justify  themselves,  and  to  vindicate  
the   seriousness   of   their   object   in   a   supposedly   hostile   academic   context.  
Hopefully,   the   days   when   Deirdre   Bair   could   fear   that   “Biography   is  
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academic   suicide”—“Die   Biographie   ist   akademischer   Selbstmord“   [Literaturen  
7/8  (2001),  quoted  in  KLEIN  2009  :  113]—are  behind  us  for  good  now.    
The   current   need   for   biography   theory,   as  well   as   the   fact   that   biography  
today  is  no  longer  viewed  solely  as  a  literary  genre,  but  much  rather  appears  
as  a  field  of  innovative  methods  of  research  common  to  several  disciplines  in  
the  humanities,   have   been   amply  demonstrated  by   the  masterful   synthetic  
works  —  on  a  widely  diachronic,  international  and  interdisciplinary  basis  —  
of   some   researchers   in   German-­‐‑speaking   countries,   like   Bernhard   Fetz,  
Hannes   Schweiger,   and   Wilhelm   Hemecker   of   the   Ludwig   Boltzmann  
Institut   für  Geschichte  und  Theorie  der  Biographie   in  Vienna,   or  Christian  
Klein  at  the  Bergischen  Universität  Wuppertal.  However,  although  they  are  
very   exhaustively   well   informed,   they   tend   to   situate   themselves   in   the  
continuation   of  Dilthey’s  Geisteswissenschaft  —  himself   the   spiritual   heir   of  
Herder  and  Droysen  —,  and  of  Literaturwissenschaft  —  literary  science  —  the  
very   academic  paradigm   that   has   been  bowled  over   by   so-­‐‑called   “French”  
theory  and  poststructuralism.  
Much  as  in  the  German-­‐‑speaking  world  “Biographieforschung”  is  bound  to  be  
suspected  of  pursuing  a  more  or  less  hidden  romantic  agenda,  in  France  any  
attempt   to   revisit   “le   biographique”   conjures   up   the   outmoded   spectres   of  
Sainte-­‐‑Beuve,  Taine,  Lanson,  and  Brunetière;  in  Britain  and  North  America,  
it  more  or  less  confusedly  runs  the  risk  of  invoking  the  ghosts  of  Emerson’s  
transcendentalism   and   Carlyle’s   hero-­‐‑worship.   That   is   understandable:   at  
the  turn  of  the  century,  when  the  dust  raised  by  the  “theory  wars”  had  still  
hardly  begun   to  settle,   the   resurgence  of   interest   in  biography  could  easily  
pass  for  a  reactionary  “anti-­‐‑theory”  backlash  —  and  no  doubt  it  was  in  some  
quarters—,  but   the   sheer   seriousness  of   the  microstoria   school  of  historians,  
and   the   development   of   life-­‐‑writing   in   the   vicinity   of   literary   and   cultural  
studies   (to   mention   but   these   two   obvious   examples)   should   be   proof  
enough  that  the  biographic  turn  is  much  more  than  this.  However,   the  fact  
that  it  was  inevitably  perceived  as  such  —  and  furthermore  the  very  fact  that  
its  own  seriousness  compelled  it  to  a  self-­‐‑criticism  of  its  deeper  motivations  
—   certainly   suffices   to   explain   the   “Theorieresistenz”   of   biography:   that   is  
most  probably  the  main  reason  why  biography  theory,  like  “the  dull  brain”  
of  the  romantic  poet  in  Keats’s  Ode  to  a  Nightingale,  “perplexes  and  retards”  
its  own  accomplishment.  
A   survey   of   the   history   of   biography,   from   the   days   of   Plutarch   and  
Suetonius,   down   to   an   analysis   of   its   problematic   relationships   with  
postmodern   theory,  has  been  a  passage  obligé  of  most  essays  devoted   to   the  
issue.  Two  monographs   in  particular,  published   in  France  at   the  beginning  
of   century   offer   very   enlightening   synthetic   reflexions   on   the   problem:   Le  
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Pari  biographique,  by  François  Dosse,  and  La  Relation  biographique,  by  Martine  
Boyer-­‐‑Weinmann.   The   latter   focuses   more   precisely   on   a   so-­‐‑called   “libido  
biographica”  in  general  literature,  thus  foregrounding  the  centrality  of  the  self  
in  literary  productions.  Dosse,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  seems  to  have  set  
out  in  this  essay  to  do  for  biography  something  like  what  Philippe  Lejeune  
had   done   for   autobiography   in   Le   pacte   autobiographique   (1975).   Neither   of  
them   seems   very   keen   to   draw   a   clear   line   between   biography   and  
autobiography,  and  that  is  a  presupposition  they  share  with  a  great  number  
of  scholarly  societies  and  journals  —  witness,  for  instance,  the  very  names  of  
the   International  Association   for  Biography  and  Autobiography   (IABA),  or  
a/b:  Auto/Biography  Studies.    
This   implicit  denial  of  any   fundamental  difference  between  biography  and  
autobiography   is   demonstrably   an   essential   characteristic   of   life-­‐‑writing  
studies.  To  some  extent,  it  may  be  one  of  the  obstacles  to  the  development  of  
biography   theory,   and   this  may   be   partly   due   to   the   influential   success   of  
Philippe  Lejeune’s  theory  of  autobiography.  Lejeune’s  “autobiographic  pact”  
is  defined  as  an  equation  between  the  author,  the  narrator,  and  therefore  the  
character.   He   yokes   biography   and   autobiography   together   under   the  
concept   of   “referential   texts”   —   “textes   référentiels”   —,   defining   the  
“referential  pact”  by  the  formula  “I  swear  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  
and  nothing  but  the  truth”  —“je  jure  de  dire  la  vérité,  toute  la  vérité,  rien  que  la  
vérité”  [36],  and  posits  the  difference  between  biography  and  autobiography  
in  terms  of  resemblance  and  identity:  
On  perçoit  déjà  ici  ce  qui  va  opposer  fondamentalement  la  biographie  
et   l’autobiographie,   c’est   la   hiérarchisation   des   rapports   de  
ressemblance   et   d’identité   ;   dans   la   biographie,   c’est   la   ressemblance  
qui   doit   fonder   l’identité,   dans   l’autobiographie,   c’est   l’identité   qui  
fonde   la   ressemblance.   L’identité   est   le   point   de   départ   réel   de  
l’autobiographie  ;   la   ressemblance,   l’impossible   horizon   de   la  
biographie.  [38]  
  
The   obvious   indebtedness   of   this   terminology   to   Ricoeur’s   celebrated  
categories  of   the   “idem”  and   the   “ipse”   lends  peremptory   authority   to   the  
assertion.   Nevertheless,   it   is   difficult   to   agree:   “resemblance”,   in   fact,   is  
hardly   ever   the   horizon   of   biography,  whose  purpose   is   not   imitative,   but  
analytical   if  we   are   speaking  of   scientific   biography,   complimentary   in   the  
case  of  authorised  or  trivial  biography,  derogatory  in  “damning  biography”  
à  la  Lytton  Strachey,  etc.  For  Lejeune,  the  “fundamental”  opposition  between  
biography   and   autobiography  would   be   a   “hiérachisation”,   that   is   to   say   a  
difference   of   degree   between   “resemblance”   and   “identity”.   The   semantic  
ambiguity   of   “identity”,   which   may   mean   either   “similarity”   or   “self”,   is  
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revealing  of  a  problematic  presupposition.  If  “identity”  means  the  self,  that  
is  to  say  a  construct,  it  simply  cannot  be  a  “real  point  of  departure”.  Neither  
can  it  be  “real”  if  it  means  “similitude”,  as  Lejeune  most  certainly  construes  
it   here:   it   is   at   best   a   logical   impossibility,   for   the   narrator   of   an  
autobiography  simply  cannot  equal  the  character,  be  it  only  because  the  self,  
“always  already”  a   construct,   is   by  definition  a  process  —  even   the   self   of  
the  dead,  who  go  on  being  written  by  the  living—,  and  as  such  is  bound  to  
remain   in   a   continual   state   of   flux.   If   biography   is  mimetic,   it   is   so   in   the  
sense  of  Ricoeur’s  “mimèsis  II”  —  “mimèsis-­‐‑création”  [94]  —  and  “mimèsis  
III:   intersection   entre   le   monde   du   texte   et   le   monde   de   l’auditeur   ou   du  
lecteur”  [144].  “What  is  resignified  by  the  narrative  is  what  has  already  been  
presignified  at  the  level  of  human  action,”  Ricoeur  also  writes  —  “Ce  qui  est  
resignifié  par  le  récit,  c’est  ce  qui  a  déjà  été  pré-­‐‑signifié  au  niveau  de  l’agir  humain”  
[153].  
No  doubt  rather  candidly  in  Lejeune,  if  certainly  less  so  in  the  discourses  of  
some   life-­‐‑writing   scholars,   the   crux  of   the  matter   is   the  difficult   and  much  
debated   concept   of   the   “self”,   or   of   the   “subject”.   In   a   post-­‐‑Derridaean  
world,  as  Michel  Foucault  has  demonstrated,  the  subject  is  “dead”  —  that  is,  
the  transcendental  subject,  which  one  must  admit  has   indeed  done   its   time  
in   the   history   of   ideas.   Exit   biography.   Enter   life-­‐‑writing,   or   the   “récit   de  
vie”,  which  so  far  has  not  felt  obliged  to  take  any  irrelevant  subject  concept  
into   consideration,   but   concentrates   instead   on   studying   the   discursive  
productions   of   individuals   always   necessarily   representative   of   one   given  
cultural   community   or   another.   The   idea   of   the   self   once   neutralised,   the  
“récits  de  vie”  can  serve  either  as  sources  or  as  a  tools  of  academic  discourse.  
The   most   remarkable   practical   result   of   this   state   of   things,   as   we   would  
argue,  is  that  “life-­‐‑writing”  —  βιο-γράϕειν (but the progressive verbal form 
makes all the difference) —  is  the  name,  the  guise,  perhaps  the  mask,  under  
which  biography  has  de  facto  emerged  on  the  modern  academic  scene  as  a  
new  discipline,  walking  from  the  start  on  the  two  legs  of  theory  and  practice,  
in   so   far   as   the   “récits   de   vie”   define   either   its   objects   or   its   methods   of  
research.   Like   all   other   incipient   disciplines,   it   is   still   in   the   process   of  
defining   itself,   in  a   continual  dialogue  with   its  neighbouring  disciplines  —  
history,   literary   science,   psychology,   sociology,   anthropology,   philosophy,  
etc.  —  appearing  more  often  than  not  as  merely  ancillary  to  one  or  the  other  
of  them,  as  long  as  its  defining  meta-­‐‑discourse  is  still  in  the  making.  In  this  
inchoative   process,   biography   theory   is   striving   to   elaborate   a   sui   generis  
modelisation,   turning   for   inspiration   to   various   other   already   theorised  
fields  of  the  humanities.  
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The   theorisation   of   biography   cannot   avoid   positioning   itself   relatively   to  
the   philosophy   of   the   subject,   and   for   this   reason   it   seems   to   have   been  
inhibited   so   far   by   a   poststructuralist   superego,   a   fantastic   academic  
Cerberus,  whose  main  three  heads  are  probably  those  of  Barthes,  Foucault,  
and   Bourdieu:   the   authors,   respectively,   of   “la   mort   de   l’auteur”   (1968),  
Herméneutique  du  sujet   (1982)  and  “L’illusion  biographique”  (1986).  But  that  
is  a  misunderstanding,  and  as  such  it  has  lasted  long  enough,  although  it  is  
dying   rather   hard.   For,   in   fact,   these   texts   constitute   seminal   points   of  
departure   for  biography   theory:  not  only  do   they  contain  nothing   likely   to  
deter   anyone   from   such   an   enterprise,   but   on   the   contrary   they   offer   very  
useful  clues  as  to  some  of  the  most  promising  directions  that  lay  open  for  it.    
This   article   is   of   course   not   the   place   to   undertake   a   fully-­‐‑fledged  
commentary  of  such  texts,  but  it  is  nevertheless  possible  to  make  just  a  few  
pointed  remarks,  with  the  hope  that  their  very  brevity,  sacrilegious  though  it  
may   be,   may   also   have   some   refreshing   effect.   For   instance,   the   stress  
Barthes   laid   on   the   “scriptor”   and   the   reader   sustains   the   reflection   that   a  
biography   is  essentially  a   reading  as  much  as  a  writing,  and   that   the  same  
may  be  said  of  a  life,  whether  the  term  is  construed  as  the  biographic  artefact  
or   its   object   —   a   life   may   be   defined   as   an   engram,   to   borrow   from   the  
neurosciences  a  term  that  designates,  so  to  speak,  an  organisation  of  matter  
encrypting   information.   Bio-­‐‑graphy,   or   life-­‐‑writing,   can   thus   be  defined   as  
both  the  reading  of  a  reading,  and  the  writing  of  a  writing.  Congruently,  one  
of   Foucault’s   most   productive   reflections   bears   on   the   “mutation   of   the  
subject’s  mode  of  being”  —  “mutation  du  mode  d’être  du  sujet”  [390]  —  which  
can   of   course   be  understood   as   the   evolution   of   the   subject   concept   in   the  
history  of   ideas,  but  which  also   leads   to   the   consideration   that  mutation   is  
the  mode  of  being  of  the  subject.  Hence  the  Lacanian  assertion  of  the  “death  
of  the  subject”—the  “aphanisis”  of  the  subject,  is  constitutive  dis-­‐‑appearance  
(α−φανειν)  —which  can  be  dialectically  reversed  into  the  proposition  that  a  
subject   is   a   life:   a   constantly   evolving   engram,   a   provisional,   evanescent  
process.   To   paraphrase   Lejeune,   that   is   the   “impossible   horizon   of  
biography”  if  there  is  one.  The  “biographic  illusion”  denounced  by  Bourdieu  
is  the  nonsensical  belief  that  it  would  be  possible  to  represent  it  as  an  object  
per  se.  By  this  text,  Bourdieu  did  not  invalidate  biography  or  life-­‐‑writing  as  
such,  but   the  naive  and  mistaken   idea   that   it   could  “understand  a   life  as  a  
unique  and  self-­‐‑sufficient  series  of  events”:  that  is,  he  said,  “nearly  as  absurd  
as   to   try   and   account   for   a   trip   in   the   metro   without   taking   into  
consideration   the   structure   of   the   network,   that   is   to   say   the   matrix   or  
objective  relations  between  the  various  stations”:  
Essayer   de   comprendre   une   vie   comme   une   série   unique   et   à   soi  
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suffisante   d'ʹévénements   successifs   sans   autre   lien   que   l'ʹassociation   à  
un   «   sujet   »   dont   la   constance   n'ʹest   sans   doute   que   celle   d'ʹun   nom  
propre,   est   à   peu   près   aussi   absurde   que   d'ʹessayer   de   rendre   raison  
d'ʹun   trajet   dans   le   métro   sans   prendre   en   compte   la   structure   du  
réseau,   c'ʹest   à   dire   la   matrice   des   relations   objectives   entre   les  
différentes  stations.    
However,   this  heavy-­‐‑gun  poetic  metaphor  of   the  “trip   in   the  metro”,  often  
quoted,  has  tended  to  obliterate  in  some  of  his  readers’  minds  the  gist  of  his  
argument,  which  is  further  explained  in  the  next  sentence:  
Les   événements   biographiques   se   définissent   comme   autant   de  
placements   et   de   déplacements   dans   l'ʹespace   social   c'ʹest   à   dire,   plus  
précisément,   dans   les   différents   états   successifs   de   la   structure   de   la  
distribution  des  différentes  espèces  de   capital  qui   sont  en   jeu  dans   le  
champ  considéré.  [71]  
A  biography,  when  it  is  worth  its  salt,  is  exactly  that:  the  study,  the  effort  to  
understand  “the  placements  and  displacements  in  the  social  space”,  “the  various  
successive  states  of  the  structure  of  the  distribution  of  different  species  of  capital  
that  are  at  stake  in  the  field  under  consideration”.  Economic  capital,  cultural,  
genetic,  etc…  Under  the  armour  of  stucturalist  jargon,  the  organic  matter  of  
thought   is   alive   indeed:   the   context,   the   environment,   the   oikos   is   the  
“matrix”   from   which   the   biographic   subjects   emerge   and   return,   and   to  
whose  constantly  evolving  states  their  lives  dialectically  participate.  
There   is  no  reason  why  biography   theory  should   imply  a  rupture  with   the  
poststructuralist  period  of  the  humanities;  quite  the  contrary,  it  results  from  
it   as   a   next   logical   step.   Just   as   this   paper   offered   space   for   a   very   few  
analeptic   examples,   it  may  yet   envisage  a  quick  proleptic  glance  at   several  
schools  of  thinking  that  are  most  likely  to  afford  food  for  thought  towards  a  
theory   of   biography.   One   of   these   directions   brings   us   back   to   the   early  
decades   of   the   20th   century,   when   Virginia   Woolf,   Lytton   Stratchey   and  
Edmund   Gosse   invented   the   “New   Biography”.   Norbert   Elias   used   to  
remark  that  the  notion  of  individuum  did  not  crystallise  on  the  designation  of  
the  human  person  before  the  17th  century,  whereas  previously  it  was  used  in  
formal  logic  to  signify  a  particular  case,  whatever  its  nature.  And  indeed,  in  
the  1920s,  the  Soviet  writer  Sergei  Tretjakov  and  his  comrades  of  the  journal  
LEF  —  Levy  Front  Iskusstv  :  the  “Left  Front  of  Arts”  —  developed  the  concept  
of   «  factography  »   and   undertook   to   write   «  biographies   of   objects  ».  
Incidentally,  the  «  Lives  of  Objects  »  was  the  topic  of  a  conference  organised  
in  2013  by  the  Oxford  Centre  for  Life-­‐‑Writing,  at  Wolfson  College.  The  idea  
that  the  notion  of  biographical  subject  could  extend  to  the  non-­‐‑human  finds  
impetus   and   resonance   if   is   related   to   the   anthropo-­‐‑sociology   of   Edgar  
Morin.   In   his   multi-­‐‑volume   work   entitled   La   Méthode,   Morin   envisions  
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“subjects”   or   “individuals”   as   belonging   potentially   to   three   levels   or  
degrees.  Subjects  of  the  first  level,  of  which  the  simple  engine  of  the  vortex  is  
the   prototype,   emerge   from   matter   as   spontaneous   events.   Organisms,  
including   human   beings,   are   subjects   of   a   second   degree   of   organisation,  
who   in   turn   collectively   give   rise   to   subjects   of   a   third   degree,   of   which  
nation-­‐‑states   count   among   the   most   formidable   representatives.   Ideas   in  
general  form  the  “noological”  strata  of  the  living  world.    
Several  remarks  therefore  impose  themselves.  Firstly,  biography  theory  will  
have   to   envisage   the   broadening   of   its   definition   of   the   subject   to   include  
infra-­‐‑   and   supra-­‐‑human   entities,   be   it   only   to   include,   for   instance,   the  
mainly   American   genre   of   “corporate   biography”,   a   variation   on   the  
“multiple   biography”   or   “group   biography”,   writing   the   lives   of  
corporations  or  companies,  and  other  collective  entities.  Whatever  its  degree  
of   organisation,   the   subject   is   produced   by   its   world,   but   simultaneously  
“co-­‐‑produces”  it,  it  “retro-­‐‑acts”  on  it  in  a  continually  recursive  “loop”  which  
Morin  call  the  “computo”  [vol.  3  :  210  &  passim]  —  a  slightly  more  elaborate  
conceptualisation  of  what  Bourdieu  calls  the  “matrix”  of  a  life  in  “L’illusion  
biographique”,  which   is  demonstrably   the  very  knot   that  biography  works  
to  unravel.    
Since   the   subject   is  only  apprehensible   as   an  evanescent   engram,   inscribing  
itself   irregularly   in   time,   its   conceptualisation   is   bound   to   entail   a   further  
reflexion  on  the  notion  of  “event”.  In  this  respect,  the  concept  of  “existential  
hapax”  —a  nonce  event,  just  as  the  hapax  legomenon  designates  a  nonce  word  
—  developed  by  Michel  Onfray  [27  &  passim]  ,  might  be  useful,  provided  its  
proximity   with   the   idea   of   grace,   or   conversion,   does   not   reintroduce   the  
transcendental  subject  by  the  back  door.   It  may  help  to  conceptualise   these  
moments   of   special   intensity   in   a   given   life   —   encounters,   discoveries,  
intuitions,   and   other   meaningful   events   —   on   which   many   modern  
biographies   tend   to   concentrate,   partly   under   the   influence   of   the   biopic  
genre  in  cinema,  instead  of  plodding  through  the  life-­‐‑stories  of  their  subjects  
from  the  cradle  to  the  grave.  To  some  extent,  the  subject  of  biography  itself,  
whose  life  is  an  écriture  as  unique  as  a  fingerprint,  may  be  conceptualised  as  
an  existential  “hapax”.  As  far  as  the  philosophy  of  the  subject  is  concerned,  a  
promising   advancement   of   knowledge   today   comes   from   some   British  
thinkers   of   the   so-­‐‑called   “analytical”   tradition   inaugurated   by   Bertrand  
Russell.   Among   those   who   are   most   likely   to   prove   useful   to   biography  
theory,  Galen  Strawson  elaborates  the  useful  concept  of  the  “thin  subject”  or  
“sesmet”  —  “the  subject  of  experience  that  is  a  single  mental  thing”  [61];  and  
Colin   McGinn,   in   his   “panmaterialist”   metaphysics,   maintains   that   “stuff,  
objects,  events,  and  laws  are  coeval  categories”  [229].  
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*  *  *  
This   introductory  paper,   voluntarily   allusive   and   elliptic   in   its   last   “open”  
page,  where  it  merely  wishes  to  adumbrate  and  suggest  some  possible  tracks  
to   be   explored   in   the   near   future,   is   an   attempt   to   posit   some   of   the  main  
issues  that  research  writers  striving  to  develop  a  theory  of  biography  have  to  
deal  with.  It  argues  that  biography  today  can  no  longer  be  considered  solely  
as  a   literary  genre,  but   that   the   factual  development  of   life-­‐‑writing  may  be  
seen  as  the  form  under  which  it  has  already  emerged  on  the  academic  scene  
as  an  incipient  discipline,  or  at  least  as  a  lively  interdisciplinary  field  in  the  
humanities.   It   further  argues   that   there   is  no  radical  contradiction  between  
biographical   studies   and   poststructuralist   theory,   but   that   quite   on   the  
contrary   it   is   the   very   reappraisal   of   the   central   concept   of   the   subject,  
operated   by   the   philosophy   of   deconstruction,   that   has   entailed   the  
emergence   of   life-­‐‑writing,   and   created   the   intellectual   need   to   theorise  
biography   in   this   larger   sense.   Life-­‐‑writing,   or   biographical   studies,   have  
defined  themselves  from  the  start  as  both  practice  and  theory,  the  “récits  de  
vie”   in   their   various   forms   functioning   both   as   objects   and   as  methods   of  
research.  Remarkably,  most  biography  scholars  are  also  biographers  or  “life-­‐‑
writers”   in   their   own   right.   Their   current   collective   effort   to   produce   a  
theory  of  biography  is  a  crucial  phase  in  the  disciplinary  development  of  the  
field.  It  is  easily  predictable  that  it  will  grow  principally  in  two  directions:  on  
the   one   hand,   the   elaboration   of   a   meta-­‐‑discourse,   that   calls,   as   we   have  
seen,  for  some  revisiting  of  key  concepts  like  those  of  “subject”  and  “event”,  
and   on   the   other   hand   a   diachronic   study   of   the   forms   and   functions   of  
biography   in   the  history  of   ideas  —  a  biography  of  biography,   if   one  dare  
say.  
The  articles   in   this   journal   issue  are  not  meant   to   cohere  as  a  whole   into  a  
proposal  towards  a  theory  of  biography:  that  is  only  the  chosen  topic  of  this  
tentative   prolegomenon.   One   the   contrary,   they   have   been   selected   as  
sample   “free-­‐‑style”   productions   by   recognised   biography   scholars   from  
several  disciplines,  and  from  various  parts  of  the  world,  to  demonstrate  the  
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